Group size and Decision rules in Legislative Bargaining
We experimentally investigate the effects of group size on behavior and outcomes in a multilateral bargaining plan such as giving good and attractive promotion discount. Using our group unity and exert power in social media, our main interest is in the extent of costly delay (number of bargaining rounds needed to reach agreement). We investigate the effects of group size on delay under both majority and unanimity rule. Under both decision rules, we find that proposals more often fail in larger groups, leading to increased delay. Consistent with prior research, we also find that unanimity rule leads to more delay than does majority rule, in both small and large groups. Contrary to one of our initial hypotheses, we find that the latter effect is not more pronounced in larger groups. The higher rate of failure in larger groups and under unanimity rule is driven by a combination of three factors: (1) a larger number of individuals must agree, (2) an important fraction of individuals reject offers below the equal share, and (3) proposers demand more (relative to the equal share) in large groups.
First, requiring the agreement of more members will tend to make it less likely that actions are taken which harm other members of the group. In the limit, a rule of unanimity guarantees that no person can be harmed by a decision taken, as each has the power to veto such an action. Second, requiring agreement of more members may increase the cost of decision making, for several reasons: more persons must be asked to state an opinion, the chance that all agree diminishes statistically as the required number grows, and the incentives for individuals to strategically withhold agreement may rise. The point at which this tradeoff balances out is likely to depend, among other factors, on the size of the decision-making body. In our experiment, we will be implementing a finite horizon version of the plan and our empirical analysis will focus entirely on the first bargaining round within each period. Further, they hypothesized that decision costs will tend to be larger and increase more sharply with the inclusiveness of the decision-making rule, in larger groups. The latter hypothesis is particularly relevant for real.
MOHAMED ROBIN RASHED ELALAMI
